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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-FTC Proceeding Will Not Toll the Statute
of Limitations in an Action Under Section 4(b)
of the Clayton Act
Plaintiff sued for treble damages, alleging violation of the anti-trust
laws by defendants attempting to monopolize the interstate trade in
wooden skewers.' The specific acts charged commenced in May, 1954,
and culminated on February 28, 1958, when plaintiff was forced out
of business. Defendant contended that any causes of action prior to
February 23, 1958, were barred by the four year statute of limitations
in section 4(b) 2 of the Clayton Act, and defendant's motion for
summary judgment with respect to these was granted. Plaintiff
argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by section 5(b)
3 of
the Clayton Act during the pendency of a Federal Trade Commission
proceeding.4 Defendant maintained that section 5(b) applies only
to "any civil or criminal proceeding" and that a Federal Trade Com-
mission proceeding did not come within this statutory language.5
Plaintiff moved to amend the court order so as to deny defendant's
motion for summary judgment. Held, amendment denied. Under
section 5(b) of the Clayton Act, a Federal Trade Commission pro-
ceeding is not a "civil or criminal proceeding" which will toll the
statute of limitations in section 4(b) of the Clayton Act. Farmington
Dowell Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967 (S.D.
Me. 1963).
Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act implements enforcement of the
anti-trust laws by providing private treble damage claimants with the
1. "This is a private action brought pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15, to recover treble damages for alleged violations of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) .... ." Farmington Dowell Prod.
Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967, 968 (S.D. Me. 1963).
2. 38 Stat. 731, (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1958).
3. Section 16(b) of title 15, U.S.C. provides that: "Whenever any civil or criminal
proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations
of any of the antitrust laws . . . the running of the statute of limitations in respect
of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in or in part on
any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency
thereof and for one year thereafter .... . 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 69 Stat.
283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
4. A Federal Trade Commission proceeding was instituted by a commission complaint
filed on July 23, 1958, charging defendants with substantially the same violations of
section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as charged in the present action. Farmington Dowcll
Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., supra note 1.
5. Id. at 969.
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opportunity to sue "after the government litigation is concluded, even
though, but for section 5, suit would have been barred by the statute
of limitations."6 As a result of the Federal Trade Commission's broad
power to enforce the anti-trust laws concurrently8 with the Justice
Department, the courts have been confronted for the first time 9
with the question whether this "government litigation" which bars
the running of the statute of limitations' ° under section 5(b) in-
cludes an FTC proceeding. Two district courts1' have considered this
question and reached conflicting results. In New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,12 the court held that
an FTC proceeding tolls the statute of limitations under section 5(b).
The court maintained that the legislative policy behind section 5(b)
is to allow litigants to take advantage of facts uncovered in related
government proceedings otherwise barred by the statute of limita-
tions.13 Since the FTC and the Justice Department have concurrent
jurisdiction over violations of the Clayton Act, it would not seem to
have been the congressional intent to have "the plaintiffs rights turn
on the fortuitous circumstances of which agency initiated the ac-
tion."14 In Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co.,15 the
court left this argument unanswered in holding that the statute of
limitations in section 5(b) is not tolled by an FTC proceeding. The
Highland court followed the majority of the courts which have
almost 16 uniformly held that an FTC proceeding is not within the
6. Butler, Application and Constitutionality of Tolling of Statute of Limitations
Provision of Section 5, Clayton Act, in Cases of Dual Enforcement Jurisdiction, ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 42, 52 (1956).
7. For an informative discussion of the broad authority of the FTC, see Clark, The
Judicial Functions of The Federal Trade Commission Should Be Transferred To The
District Courts, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 51 (1957).
8. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass.
1950) (No difference in substantive antitrust law applied by the Commission and
that applied by the court).
9. Farmington Dowell Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co. supra note 1, at 969.
10. For a general discussion of problems involving the application of the statute
of limitations to antitrust treble damage suits, see Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage
Suits Against Electrical Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Handles,
57 Nw. U.L. REv. 29 (1962).
11. For a recent decision that follows Highland Supply Corp., infra note 15, in
holding that § 5(b) does not apply to the FTC, see Volasco Prod. Co. v. Fry
Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
12. 216 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1963).
13. See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2332 (1955).
14. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note
12, at 510.
15. 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963), aff'd, 32 U.S.L. Week 2421 (8th Cir.
Feb. 13, 1964).
16. See Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling & Billiard Corp., 150
F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1945).
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statutory scope of "government litigation" as defined in the Clayton
Act.17 The basis for these decisions has been the contention that the
legislative history 8 indicates that Congress did not intend for FTC
proceedings to come within the purview of section 5.
In the instant case, the court followed the legislative history ap-
proach of Highland.19 Although the court alluded to the opposing
rationale of the New Jersey20 case, it neglected to rebut that argu-
ment. The court concerned itself exclusively with a strict interpreta-
tion of the legislative and judicial history of section 5 of the Clayton
Act. 21 At the base of the court's reasoning was the proposition that
section 5(b) must be construed in context with the companion
provision of section 5(a).22 This thesis is based on the contention
17. Until 1955, the pertinent language in § 5(b) was: "Whenever any suit or
proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution .... ." These words were deleted in the
1955 amendment and replaced by the words "any civil or criminal proceeding." 38
Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1955). From
the relevant legislative history there is no basis for reasoning that Congress intended
any substantive change. Note 13 supra. The probable reason for the change was to
secure conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Butler, supra note 6, at 46. Thus the crux of the problem is the
courts' interpretation of the words "suit or proceeding in equity" and "criminal prosecu-
tion" in Section 5 of the original Clayton Act. With regard to the "suit or proceeding
in equity" the Supreme Court held in FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927),
that "the Commission exercises only the administrative functions delegated to it by
the act, not judicial powers . . . . It has not been delegated the authority of a court
of equity." Id. at 623. This holding is further substantiated by Proper v. John Bene
& Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923), where the court held in a case involving
section 5(a) that "there is grave doubt whether the proceeding before the commission
is a proceeding in equity." Id. at 732. The Supreme Court in FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683 (1948), emphatically endorses the principle that an FTC proceeding is
not a criminal proceeding. The court emphasized that "rules which bar certain types
of evidence in criminal or quasi-criminal cases are not controlling in proceedings ...
where the effect of the Commission's order is not to punish or fasten liability on
respondents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for the future." Id. at 706.
Butler explains why the term "civil proceeding" does not encompass the FTC proceed-
ing when he says that "it might not be so farfetched to construe the term 'civil
proceeding,' standing alone, to include FTC proceedings, if it were not for the fact
that the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 1001(g) ), has more aptly designated
them as 'agency proceedings,' and that is their proper classification." Butler, supra
note 6, at 46.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1914); S. REP. No. 698, 63rd
Cong. 2d Sess. (1914); 51 CONG. REc. 9073, 9079, 9198 (1914).
19. Supra note 15.
20. Supra note 12.
21. Farmington Dowell Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co. supra note 1, at 970.
22. "iT]hat subsection [5(b)] must be construed in context with the companion
provision of section 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) by which a 'final judgment or decree ...
in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under
the antitrust laws' is admissable as prima facie evidence in a private treble damage
action." Ibid. See also Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561,
569 (10th Cir. 1961); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284,
290 (7th Cir. 1954).
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that the subsections are substantially identica 3 and that they must
be applied consistently to carry out the purpose of the statute.24
Major emphasis was given to the fact that section 5 has been in effect
forty-nine years, and before 1963 it had never been applied to the
FTC.2 The court substantiated this argument by citing the findings
of a number of courts which have held in related litigation that an
FTC proceeding is neither a "criminal proceeding" nor a "suit or
proceeding in equity" nor a "civil prosecution" under either the
original or the amended Clayton Act.
26
Although the view espoused by the Farmington court is logically
based on the legislative and judicial history, the implementation of
this view will result in illogical and discriminatory results. Since the
FTC and the Department of Justice have concurrent jurisdiction27
over anti-trust violations, under the holding of the instant case the
plaintiff's rights are determined by the circumstance of which agency
initiates the action. Where the FTC takes jurisdiction the suit is
barred when the statutory period has run; if the Justice Department
takes jurisdiction in the same action the statute of limitations is tolled
under section 5(b), and plaintiff is allowed to bring his private
action with the further advantage of facts uncovered by the Justice
Department litigation. It is illogical to allow a plaintiff to utilize
facts procured as a result of a Department of Justice proceeding, but
not as a result of an FTC proceeding brought under the same statute.
Butler argues that "this... is a gross discrimination which under the
circumstances is so unjustifiable as to amount to a denial of due
process in violation of the Fifth Amendment." 28 If the Farmington
court had more closely scrutinized the obvious results of this decision,
the lustre of the judicial and legislative history of section 5 might
have dimmed when compared to the consistent and congruous re-
sults where the statute of limitations is tolled under section 5(b)
regardless of the government agency which brings the action.
23. Butler, supra note 6, at 47.
24. See Rubenstein, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 154 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.
Minn. 1957), aff'd, 289 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1961).
25. Farmington Dowell Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., supra note 1, at 973.
26. Id. at 972-73.
27. Supra note 8.
28. Butler, supra note 6, at 52.
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Conflict of Laws-Where None of the Beneficiaries Reside
in Forum State, Limitation on Amount of Recovery
Imposed by State Where Tort Occurred Governs.
Gordon Dean was killed when the Northeast Airlines plane on which
he was a passenger crashed on Nantucket, Massachusetts. The de-
ceased, who purchased his ticket and boarded the plane in New York,
was a resident of New York and lived there with his wife and two of
his children. Two children of a prior marriage resided in California.
About a month after the crash the widow and children moved from
New York. They have lived in Maryland for the last five years. The
defendant, Northeast Airlines, is a Massachusetts corporation doing
business in New York. The executor of decedent's estate brought suit
in a New York court, subsequently removed to the federal district
court, for wrongful death against the Massachusetts corporation. The
plaintiff moved to strike the affirmative defense that the Massachusetts
wrongful death statute' pursuant to which the action was brought
limits the recoverable damages to fifteen-thousand dollars. On motion
to strike, held, denied. Even though the rule that the law of the place
of the tort governs was abandoned in New York cases for wrongful
death growing out of this same crash, the Massachusetts limitation will
apply here because none of the beneficiaries were New York residents
when the suit was commenced. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222
F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
In a companion case arising out of the same crash, Kilberg v. North-
east Airlines, Inc.,2 the New York Court of Appeals announced that the
plaintiff would have to sue on the Massachusetts wrongful death stat-
ute, but that the Massachusetts provision limiting the amount of re-
covery should not be applied. A concurring opinion recognized that
the court was laying down a new rule of law "undermining the accept-
ed pattern of conflict of law rules, in effect overruling numerous
decisions of this court, and completely disregarding the overwhelming
weight of authority in this country."3 The court, resting its ruling on
the state's strong public policy prohibiting the imposition of such
limitations and on a policy decision that the result should not depend
on the fortuity of the place of the tort, held that it would treat the
measure of damages as a procedural rather than a substantive question
and apply New York law.4 After Kilberg, another wrongful death case
I. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1955). The statute has since been amended
raising the upper limit of recovery to $30,000. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Supp.
1963).
2. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961), 15 VAND. L. REV. 271 (1961).
3. Id. at 46, 172 N.E.2d at 532.
4. The ground of the opinion in Kilberg was modified by a later case and no longer
should be considered as depending on a distinction between substantive and procedural
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arising out of the same accident, Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,5
brought by the New York beneficiary of the New York decedent in
New York was removed to federal district court. Obligated to apply
New York law, the court, relying on Kilberg, held that the Massachu-
setts statute would not limit the beneficiary's recovery to fifteen-thou-
sand dollars. Going one step further, the court held that the New York
standard of recovery measured by the degree of pecuniary damage
resulting from the decedent's death to the person or persons for whose
benefit the action is brought, rather than the Massachusetts standard
measured by the degree of culpability of the defendant, would apply.
The federal court thus fully implemented the Kilberg ruling.
Then the New York Court of Appeals spoke again. In Babcock v.
Jackson,6 in clear, unmistakeable terms, it repudiated the traditional
rule and held that the law of the place of the tort will not "invariably
govern the availability of relief for the tort .... 7 It held that the appli-
cable choice of law rule should "reflect a consideration of other factors
which are relevant to the purposes served by the enforcement or denial
of the remedy .... ,,1 Babcock presented the court with a strong fact
situation on which to repudiate the old rule. Babcock, a guest passen-
ger, was seriously injured in an automobile accident in Ontario while
on a weekend excursion into Canada. An Ontario statute provided
that the owner or driver of a vehicle would not be liable to guest
passengers. The guest passenger on her return to New York brought
suit to recover for her injuries. The court noted that "the present
action involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as a result of
the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile,
garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course
of a week-end journey which began and was to end there."9 The irrele-
vance of Ontario law in such a situation was striking. Holding that the
Ontario guest statute would not apply, the court cited three closely
related reasons. First, the court recognized New York's policy of re-
questions. It "must be held merely to express this State's strong policy with respect to
limitations in wrongful death actions." Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 395, 183
N.E.2d 902, 904 (1962).
5. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1962). The court sitting en
banc held that the district court decision implementing the Kilberg decision was not
unconstitutional. "[A] state with substantial ties to a transaction in dispute has a
legitimate constitutional interest in the application of its own rules of law." 309 F.2d at
559. That the United States Supreme Court would sanction this view is indicated in the
dictum of an earlier federal tort claims case. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12
(1962), 15 VAND. L. REv. 1322 (1962).
6. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). Several authorities give complete treat-
ment to this case in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1212 (1963). See also 17 VAND. L. REv. 283 (1963).
7. Supra note 6 at 477, 191 N.E.2d at 280-81.
8. Ibid.
9. Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284.
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quiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his
negligence saying "our courts have neither reason nor warrant for de-
parting from that policy simply because the accident, solely affecting
New York residents ... happened beyond its borders."10 Secondly, the
court, comparing the relative interest of New York and Ontario in the
application of the Ontario guest statute, found that "Ontario has no
conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against
his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of conduct
which was tortious under Ontario law."" Thirdly, the court said that
the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contracts" doctrine adopted .by
the court in conflicts cases involving contracts likewise afforded an
"appropriate approach for accommodating the competing interests in
tort cases with multi-State contacts."
12
Notwithstanding the similarity of the instant case to Kilberg and
Pearson, the court held that the Massachusetts limitation on the
amount recoverable in a death action would apply because the status
of the beneficiaries was different. In both Kilberg and Pearson the sole
beneficiary was a New York domiciliary at the time of decedent's death
and when the suit was commenced. In this case two children of a prior
marriage were living at the time of decedents death in California.
About a month after the crash, the decedents widow and her two chil-
dren moved from New York and for the last five years have lived in
Maryland. Referring to Kilberg the court said: "[I]t is clear from its
reference to the history of the development of the State's strong public
policy on the subject that the court's concern was to serve those who
are, practically, the only appropriate objects of that policy, namely,
the deceased's surviving dependents who are domiciled in New
York... ."13 Thus the court found no New York public policy to secure
full compensation to beneficiaries who are at the time of death foreign
domiciliaries. As to Mrs. Dean and her children who were New York
domiciliaries at the time of the death, the court concluded that Mary-
land, their home for the last five years, was the jurisdiction with the
strongest interest' 4 in them now and that since Maryland would have
applied Massachusetts law, the limitation should be applied.
The swift changes in the conflict of laws rules as to torts are made
vivid by the recent cases in the state and federal courts in New York.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283. The court in the instant case does not refer to
this concept.
13. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
14. Almost certainly the Babcock court meant by this term the governmental interest
in whether the policy behind a particular law was implemented or subverted. There is
a real danger in using the term as a catchword without identifying explicitly the policy
considerations involved. In the instant case one can only guess at the considerations
which lead the court to conclude that Maryland has the strongest interest.
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An old and established rule has been repudiated and the arduous task
of formulating new rules to conform to new considerations has begun.
In choosing the law to be applied, the federal judge, in line with
Kilberg and Babcock, attempted to take into account the public policy
and interest of the states involved. The difficulties of employing these
considerations is made graphic by the present case. For example,
identifying public policy is not without difficulty. In Babcock, for in-
stance, the court had no statutory law on which to rely as a pronounce-
ment of New York's public policy. On the contrary, the New York
court relied on the absence of a law. "New York's policy of requiring a
tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his negligence
cannot be doubted-as attested by the fact that the Legislature of this
State has repeatedly refused to enact a statute denying or limiting re-
covery in such cases ...."-15 Nevertheless, the statutory law of a state
would presumably be one of the best indications of that state's public
policy. In Davenport v. Webb,'6 however, the plaintiff, relying on
Kilberg, asked for prejudgment interest. The New York court denied
addition of prejudgment interest to the verdicts for the wrongful death
of New York decedents killed in Maryland, a state which does not pro-
vide for such interest. The only substantial reason was that "'the
Legislature had no intention to make it reach so far . . . "7 Chief
Judge Desmond concurred in the result "since there is no New York
public policy ... ."I" Yet New York law expressly provides for such
interest. 9 In the light of Babcock, Davenport appears to be an ano-
maly. In the instant case, likewise, the court found no public policy
that would warrant securing full compensation to the California bene-
ficiaries "because they are the children of a New York domiciliary who,
after they had established their foreign domicile, was killed in a foreign
state which by statute limits the amount of damages ...."20 Obvious-
ly New York could have developed no public policy in this particular
situation because the question would never have arisen under the tra-
ditional choice of law rule. It should be noted, however, that the New
York wrongful death statute2 ' makes no distinction between New York
and foreign beneficiaries-even aliens are allowed to recover.22 It is
not difficult to find a "policy" in this, whether or not articulated. That
15. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (1963).
16. 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902 (1962).
17. Id. at 394, 183 N.E.2d at 904.
18. Id. at 395, 183 N.E.2d at 905.
19. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 132.
20. Supra note 13 at 53. One important question is whether the constitutional man-
date on privileges and immunities is satisfied. "The citizens of each State shall be en-
titled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CoNsT. art.
IV, § 2(1).
21. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 130.
22. Tanas v. Municipal Gas Co., 88 App. Div. 251, 84 N.Y.S. 1053 (1903).
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New York allows foreign beneficiaries to recover would seem to indi-
cate a policy of not limiting recovery under the wrongful death statute
to domiciliaries. Decedents wife and her two children come within
the ambit of this court's narrow interpretation of New York public
policy; nevertheless, they too are denied recovery, because Maryland
has the strongest interest2 The court reasons that Maryland has the
strongest interest in the decedent's wife and her children, and that,
since Maryland would have applied Massachusetts law, the New York
court should exercise restraint 24 and "not subordinate the interest of
Massachusetts."25 This certainly seems inadequate in light of the New
York court's statement of its interest in this occurrence:
The emphasis in Kilberg was plainly that the merely fortuitous circum-
stance that the wrong and injury occurred in Massachusetts did not give that
State a controlling concern or interest in the amount of the tort recovery as
against the competing interest of New York in providing its residents or
users of transportation facilities there originating with full compensation for
wrongful death.
26
Clearly this expresses a broad New York interest in protecting not only
New York beneficiaries, but New York decedents2 7 as well. Even if
New York has no interest at all in the beneficiaries, recovery for the
decedents wife and her children should still be allowed. Considering
prior New York holdings that in an action for wrongful death the
distributees of the decedent receive vested property from the moment
the cause of action accrues 28 any other decision seems arbitrary. Ac-
23. Exactly what interest Maryland has in the rights and liabilities arising out of this
occurrence that happened while plaintiff was a citizen of New York is not clear. If a
state's interest is to be attributed to residence, the converse of the fact situation in Core
is especially interesting. What if decedent had been a New York resident whose only
beneficiaries lived in Maryland and immediately after the crash they moved to New
York? Would New York then be the state with the strongest interest?
24. In this regard the court relies on Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E,2d
902 (1962), as an indication that the New York court would exercise restraint "in
applying New York's own policies." That case disclaimed any finding of a public policy.
Furthermore, though the case is post-Kilberg, it is pre-Babcock and was, therefore,
decided before New York's unequivocal break with the traditional choice of law rule.
25. Supra note 13, at 54. The defendant is a Massachusetts corporation and an in-
tended beneficiary of Massachusetts' policy of limiting recovery in death actions. In
Kilberg, the New York court indicated that it would subordinate Massachusetts' interest;
Pearson did. For an argument that the forum state should not subordinate its interest
when its interest conflicts with another state see Currie, The Constitution and the
Choice of Law: Government Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. Rm'. 9,
10 (1958).
26. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 480, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1963).
27. The wrongful death statute has been compared to an insurance policy affording
protection to the deceased resident. Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory"
Cause of Action, 73 HAav. L. Rr-v. 36, 46-47 (1959).
28. In re Thompson's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 604, 231 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1962) (the rights
are descendible and transferable); Kohn v. Bates, 194 Misc. 833, 87 N.Y.S.2d 537,
rev'd on other grounds, 275 App. Div. 431, 90 N.Y.S.2d 391, (1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y.
722, 92 N.E.2d 60 (1950).
cording to the holding of this court, Dean's wife and children lost a
right simply because they moved (deprived of decedent's income, per-
haps they were forced to move) from New York. Interest is a many-
faceted criterion which should have been dealt with less generally.
Writing on an essentially clean slate, the courts should be particularly
careful to explicitly identify the considerations of public policy and
interest on which they base their determination, for they are essen-
tially promulgating a new set of rules on choice of law. In determining
public policy, the courts should recognize that much public policy is
implicit in the law-not having demanded expression until now. In an
applicable case, this public policy too should be expressly identified
and explicitly considered.
Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy-Conviction
of Greater Degree of Offense on Retrial
Defendant, after pleading not guilty to murder, moved that his counsel
be discharged, changed his plea to guilty, and waived his right to trial by
jury. The court found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.' The District Court of Appeals re-
versed on the grounds that the defendant was improperly allowed to with-
draw his not guilty plea after his counsel had been ordered discharged.2
The case was remanded for a new trial. In the second trial defendant
pleaded not guilty, and the prosecution introduced evidence which had
been withheld because of the waiver and guilty plea in the first trial.3 The
court found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and sen-
tenced him to death. On appeal the California Supreme Court held, re-
versed. The character of the sentence establishes, for that degree of crime,
the grade of punishment above which the defendant may not be sentenced
upon subsequent retrial. 4 People v. Henderson, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d
677 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
Concerning the issue in the instant case, the vast majority of courts have
followed the view that on appeal from a conviction of first degree murder
and a sentence of life imprisonment, the defendant could be given the
death sentence without violating the various double jeopardy provisions
1. People v. Henderson, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Brief for
Appellee, pp. 1-5.
2. People v. Henderson, supra note 1.
3. Id. at 86, 386 P.2d at 686 (dissenting opinion).
4. Ibid.
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of the United States Constitution,5 state constitutions, statutes, and the
common law.6 The reasoning of these courts is based on the idea that in
such cases there was only one degree of the crime involved and the only
controversy was over the punishment to be inflicted. Therefore, the reason-
ing continues, the determination of such penalty had nothing to with the
guilt or innocence of the defendant for the degree of crime charged.7 In
support of this position, courts have pointed out that the protection af-
forded by the Constitution is only against a second trial for the same
offence.8 The ground work for the decision in the instant case was laid by
Green v. United States,9 in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a man convicted of second degree murder cannot be convicted
of first degree murder when granted a new trial.10 Prior to that decision,
there were opposing views on that particular issue." The basis of the de-
cisions allowing a conviction for a greater degree of murder on appeal
from a lesser degree seems to be that when the defendant by his own
motion asks for a new trial, he waives his objection to the second prosecu-
tion.12 Courts supporting this view urge that the verdict of conviction
should be treated as a single entity, that the new trial necessarily, reopens
the whole proceeding, and that the defendant cannot stand on part of the
verdict and repudiate the rest.13 A contrary result has been reached by
many courts which reason that conviction of a lesser degree of an offense
charged is tantamount to and operates as an acquittal of the greater of-
fense, and that therefore the new trial must be for no greater degree than
5. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), rehearing denied, ,51 U.S. 380
(1920); see also Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
6. People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907) (CAL. CONST. art I, § 13
(1879), incorporates the doctrine of double jeopardy into California law); State v.
Kneeskern, 203 Iowa 929, 210 N.W. 465 (1926) (double jeopardy protection eminated
from IowA CODE §§ 4728-31 (1897); Greer v. State, 62 Tenn. 321 (1854) (this case
demonstrates that double jeopardy is incorporated in the law of Tennessee through the
common law); MAss, ANN. L-ws ch. 263, §§ 7-8A (1956). But see 38 DicK. L. REV.
276 (1934).
7. Stroud v. United States, supra note 5; State v. Kneeskern, supra note 6; 24 MINN.
L. REv. 522, 537 (1940). But see 38 Dic. L. REV. supra note 6.
8. Stroud v. United States, supra note 5; Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163
(1873).
9. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
10. Id. at 198 (of course, this is only highly persuasive authority as far as state
courts are concerned).
11. People v. Henderson, supra note 1, at 686; 36 N.C.L. REV. 485, 488 (1958)
(citing sixteen states that hold in accord with the Green case and sixteen states that
hold opposite).
12. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); Miller v. United States, 224 F.2d
561 (5th Cir. 1955); Morgan v. State, 35 Tenn. 475 (1856); 1 Bisuop, CUNAL
LAw § 998 (9th ed. 1923); 1 WHAT-oTN, CnnvmNAr LAw § 396 (12th ed. 1932); 24
MnN. L. REv. supra note 7, at 534.
13. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 531, 534 (1905) (when defendant at
his own request "has obtained a new trial he must take the burden with the benefit,
and go back for a new trial of the whole case."); Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573, 575,
64 S.E. 676, 677 (1909); State v. Correll, 229 N.C. 640, 50 S.E.2d 717 (1948).
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that for which defendant was convicted at the first trial.14 Thus, they
reason, the defendant does not waive his right to be secure against a sec-
ond prosecution. 15 The Supreme Court, by a five to four decision, in the
Green case accepted the latter reasoning. The Court expressed the opinion
that the defendant does not have to barter his constitutional protection
against a second prosecution for a higher offense in order to appeal from
a conviction of a lesser offense. The Court then ruled that a defendant
should not be forced into the dilemma of accepting a verdict he feels to
be erroneous or risking an appeal on which he could be convicted of a
greater crime. Following from this reasoning is the conclusion that, while
the defendant may voluntarily waive his right not be retried for the charge
for which he was convicted, it is erroneous to think that the defendant
voluntarily waives the right not to be retried on the degree of crime for
which he was acquitted.
16
In the instant case, Judge Traynor extends the reasoning of the Court in
the Green case to cover situations where, on retrial, a greater punishment
is imposed for the same conviction. The court reasoned that "it is immate-
rial to the basic purpose of the constitutional provisions against double
jeopardy whether the Legislature divides a crime into different degrees
carrying different punishments or allows the court or jury to fix different
punishments for the same crime." 17 The result seems to be the same in
both types of cases. If, on appeal from an erroneous judgment and life
imprisonment sentence, the defendant can be sentenced to death he may
be forced by such risk to allow the erroneous judgment to stand. The
court emphasized that the decision in the Green case destroyed the basis
on which most courts had allowed the imposition of a greater sentence at
a second trial for the same offence.' 8 Judge Traynor's ratio decidendi
seems to have been the public policy consideration that a defendant
should not have to face any risk in appealing a conviction which he feels
is erroneous. 19
There are technical reasons for extending the holding of the Green case
to the facts involved in the instant case: a man tried and convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment is acquitted of the
capital grade of the crime;20 and a man does put his life in jeopardy by
appealing from a murder conviction with a life sentence if, at the new
trial, he can be sentenced to death. However, the great body of case law
14. People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376 (1854); Slaughter v. State, 25 Tenn. 410 (1846);
Jones v. State, 13 Tex. 168 (1854).
15. 24 Mn. L. pE-v., supra note 7, at 537.
16. Green v. United States, supra note 9, at 197.
17. People v. Henderson, supra note 1, at 86, 386 P.2d at 686.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. But the Supreme Court in the Green case stated that such a case as the instant
one is distinguishable from their decision. Green v. United States, supra note 9, at 195.
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pointing clearly the other way indicates that the reasons for a holding
opposite that of the instant case have been highly persuasive to many
courts.21 Supporting this large body of case law are sound public policy
reasons which oppose the result reached in this case. One of the greatest
effects of this decision, if extended to all types of sentences, would be to
make appeal virtually automatic, thus clogging the already over-burdened
appellate courts.22 A further result of the decision would be to force prose-
cuting attorneys to be more assiduous when prosecuting a case where a
defendant who deserved the death penalty23 had pleaded guilty and waived
jury trial than is now the practice.24 Also the trial courts would have to
take more time when determining sentence and would possibly have to be
stricter in such cases, rather than giving a more lenient sentence in ex-
change for a short trial.25 Another argument against the instant decision
is that here a savage murder was comitted by the defendant, and he es-
caped the death penalty, not because of any mitigating circumstances, but
by outwitting the trial court.2 Perhaps this decision is best justified when
limited to cases involving capital punishment. If so limited, the clog on
our court system will not be as burdensome, and the decision of the in-
stant case will not bear so greatly against precedent. Justification becomes
more difficult if the instant decision is extended to crimes involving less
than capital punishment, for an extra year, or even five years, is not such
an inhibition of appeal as is the chance of receiving the death penalty.
This question is not specifically treated by the instant case, and whether
it can be said that a man sentenced to fifteen to twenty years has been
acquitted of a sentence of twenty to twenty-five years still seems to be
an open question.27
21. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
22. 24 MIN. L. REv., supra note 7, at 562.
23. The word "deserve" is used in light of the assumption that the death penalty
is in effect and justifiable. The debate as to its justification is beyond the scope of
this article.
24. For discussion of public prosecutor's discretion see SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY ANID ADMINISTRATIoN or CRIMlNAL JUSTICE
10-20 (1961).
25. Id.
26. For detail of the crime for which appellant was convicted, see Brief for Appellee
pp. 5-20, People v. Henderson, supra note 1.
27. For a basis of such a limitation, the instant case should be compared with Hicks
v. Commonwealth, 185 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 1962) (where the court distinguishes the
Green decision and allows on retrial a sentence of three to seven years when the origi-
nal sentence had been two to seven years).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-No Requirement that
Agent Appointed To Receive Service of Process be
Expressly Bound To Give Notice to Principal
Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in New York City, was engaged in a nationwide business of equip-
ment rentals. Defendants, two Michigan farmers, leased two incu-
bators from plaintiff. The lease agreement, a standard printed form
used extensively by plaintiff, was slightly less than one and one-half
pages long and consisted of eighteen numbered paragraphs. The last
of these designated Florence Weinberg as defendant's agent to receive
service of process in New York State.' Plaintiff subsequently instituted
suit in the federal district court in New York on the basis of diversity
of citizenship, alleging that defendants had breached the lease agree-
ment. Personal service was made on Mrs. Weinberg as the appointed
agent of the defendants within Rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.2 Mrs. Weinberg promptly sent notice of the impend-
ing litigation to the defendants. Defendants' attorney appeared spe-
cially and moved that the summons be quashed, urging (1) that the
service was insufficient because Mrs. Weinberg was not required by
the contract to give defendants notice of any service made on her as
their agent; and (2) that the agency was invalid because Mrs. Wein-
berg had a conflict of interest.3 The district court sustained defend-
ants' motion,4 and the court of appeals affirmed.5 On certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. In private contracts
appointing an agent to receive service of process within Rule 4(d) (1),
there is no requirement, under either federal or New York law, that the
agent expressly be bound to give notice of the service to the defend-
ants. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311
(1964).
1. The last paragraph read as follows:
"This agreement shall be deemed to have been made in Nassau County, New York,
regardless of the order in which the signatures of the parties shall be affixed hereto, and
shall be interpreted, and the rights and liabilities of the parties here determined, in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York; and the Lessee hereby designates
Florence Weinberg, 47-21 Forty-first street, Long Island City, N.Y., as agent for the
purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York."
2. "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be served
together. . . . Service shall be made as follows:
"(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person ...by de-
livering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of process." FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
3. Defendants contended that the conflict of interest arose from the fact that Mrs.
Weinberg was the wife of an officer of the plaintiff corporation and was not personally
known to them.
4. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 30 F.R.D. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
5. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962). Noted in
40 U. DET. L.J. 543 (1963) 65 W. VA. L. REv. 338 (1963).
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Since 1789, when the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act0 estab-
lishing our system of federal courts, there has been a continuing debate
over what law they will apply.7 Swift v. Tyson,8 the Supreme Court's
first real attempt to solve this problem, said that a federal court trying
a diversity suit must apply federal substantive law and state procedural
rules. In 1937 and 1938, the whole body of law that had developed
around Swift v. Tyson was reversed. The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure9 were passed, making federal procedure operative in all federal
courts.10 On April 25, 1938, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," expressly over-
ruled Swift v. Tyson and held that state substantive law and federal
procedural rules were to be applied by federal courts in diversity
cases.' 2 The practice of some federal courts of making formalistic dis-
tinctions between procedural matters and substantive law was dis-
approved by the Court's holding in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.13 If a
state rule, even though classified as procedural, would determine the
outcome of the suit, it should be considered as state substantive law 14
and must be followed.15 The Erie doctrine, as it was clarified by
6. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
7. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of Decision Act, provided that
"the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as the rules of deci-
sion in trial at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply." 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
8. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
9. The Federal Rules were promulgated on December 20, 1937, and became effec-
tive on September 16, 1938. It is interesting to note that the decision of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), came in between these two dates, being decided on
April 25, 1938.
10. The Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1959).
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The writings on Erie are voluminous. See, e.g., Clark, State Law in. the Federal
Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946);
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diver-
sity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957).
12. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state .... There is no federal general
common law." Erie R.R. v. Tompklns, supra note 9, at 78 (Brandeis, J.). See WsuarT,
FEDEL CourTs § 60 (1963), for a discussion of the present day validity of this state-
ment.
13. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
14. "If the law does 'significantly affect the result of a litigation' and 'the outcome of
the litigation,' it constitutes the substantive law of the State and should be followed.
However, if it 'concerns merely the manner and the means by which the rights of the
parties are determined, it is the procedural or adjective law of the State and need not
be followed."' Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Kielhorn, 98 F. Supp. 288, 293 (W.D. Mich.
1951). See also Dam v. General Elec. Co., 144 F. Supp. 175, 179 (E.D. Wash. 1956).
15. Bernhardt v. Polgraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (federal courts bound in a
diversity suit to follow old Vermont authorities refusing to honor arbitration clauses in
contracts between litigating parties); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
337 U.S. 530 (1949) (state law held to control when it was in conflict with rule 3);
Guaranty Trust,16 was again recast by the Court's holding in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.'7 that, if there was a prevailing federal
policy supporting the use of a federal.rule (and to follow a state rule
would disrupt the federal policy), then the federal policy must gov-
ern.'8 The Erie doctrine, as it has subsequently been defined and
clarified, has had a profound effect upon the application and operation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19 The Federal Rules were con-
ceived with the intention of promoting uniformity of procedure among
the federal courts,20 but with the advent of Erie this idea of uniformity
has disappeared in many instances-notably, in situations where the
federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.2' This problem
arises from the fundamental conflict between the underlying policy of
the Federal Rules and the goal sought to be attained by Erie. The
policy of the Federal Rules is to strive for uniformity within all fed-
eral district courts, while the Erie decision sought to bring about uni-
formity of all courts sitting within the same state.22 The cases of
Guaranty Trust23 and Byrd24 were attempts by the Supreme Court to
adjust the two views, reduce the conflict to a minimum, and still attain
these two different types of uniformity. Thus, the test has evolved into
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) ("Where . . .one is barred
from recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal court.");
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (held state rule
superior when it was in conflict with rule 23).
16. Supra note 13.
17. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
18. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., id. at 537-38, the Court found the controlling
federal policy to be that of "allocating functions between judge and jury." See Jaftex
Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1960) (the court found the
federal policy to be "that they [the parties] are entitled to the essentials of a trial
according to federal standards"); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 407-08 (5th
Cir. 1960) (Federal Rules and policy of uniformity within federal courts); Odedirk v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 274 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 974 (1960);
lovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A
Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TuL. L. REV. 443 (1962).
19. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); see also cases
cited supra note 15.
Most commentators have felt that the Erie doctrine has seriously impaired the Federal
Rule's policy of uniformity within all federal courts. See Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey &
Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNF.LL L.Q. 494 (1949); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A
Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950).
20. United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 1 F.R.D. 295, 307 (W.D.N.Y. 1940);
"These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a
civil nature. .. ." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
21. Note 19 supra.
22. The fundamental purpose underlying diversity jurisdiction was to insure a non-
resident a fair trial, free from local bias, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 13, at
111-12; Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 87 (1809),
while Erie sought to protect the local resident from "forum shopping" by the non-resi-
dent-the result should be the same whether the suit is in a state court or a federal
court.
23. Supra note 13.
24. Supra note 17.
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following a valid state policy25 unless there is a prevailing federal poli-
cy, at which time the state policy must yield to the federal rule.20
Consequently, it has been held that the basis of the federal courts'
jurisdiction is to be decided by federal law,2 7 while state law controls
any question of the amenability of a defendant to service of process in
a diversity suit.28 After this issue is decided, there remains the further
question of the sufficiency of the service of process. Although this
question has never been squarely decided by a federal court, it has
usually been said that it should be governed by standards of federal
law because of the superiority of the federal policy of uniform proce-
dural rules among federal courts over any state service-of-process
rule.29 Although it is well settled that a person may consent to the
jurisdiction of a court and thereby waive any objections to that court's
lack of jurisdiction or to his own amenability to suit therein,31 such
consent to jurisdiction does not constitute a waiver of objections ad-
dressed to the validity of the service of process. It is submitted that a
person could consent to jurisdiction and make himself amenable to
suit by appointing an agent to receive service of process, yet the serv-
ice on his agent could still be invalid because of improper service or a
defect in the agency appointment.
In the instant case, the Court disposed of the defendant's allegation
of invalidity of the agency appointment on the grounds of conflict of
interest by holding that, where, as here, the scope of the agent's
authority is so limited, it can not be seriously contended that it is in
conflict with the defendant's interest in prompt notification.31 The
Court further held that, in private contracts appointing an agent to
receive service of process within Rule 4(d) (1), there is no require-
25. See cases cited supra note 15.
26. See cases cited supra note 18.
27. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941); Kresberg v. International
Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 764 (1945) (classifying jurisdiction as
a federal question).
28. The states have a valid policy in determining what persons are amenable to suit
within their jurisdictions which they have expressed in their statutes. "[W]e find no
federal policy that should lead federal courts in diversity cases to override valid state
laws as to the subjection of foreign corporations to suit, in the absence of direction by
federal statute or rule. State statutes determining what foreign corporations may be
sued, for what, and by whom, are not mere whimsy; like most legislation they represent
a balancing of various considerations ... " Arrowsmith v. United Press Intl, 320 F.2d
219 (2d Cir. 1963). See cases cited in Arrowsmith, at 223, for other authorities on this
issue; and for cases contra, see citations in Justice Clark's dissent at 2,34, 24244.
Federal law is important on one aspect of the question of amenability to suit in a
diversity case, for it places a constitutional limitation on the state's exercise of its juris-
dictional power. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Pulson
v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); 1 BAmnON & HOLiOFr,
FEDn3AL PnA-CTE & PROCEDUnE 695-96 (Wright rev. 1960).
29. 1 BAmON & HOLiOFF, op. cit. supra note 28, at 697, 701 and cases cited therein.
30. Kenny Constr. Co. v. Allen, 248 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
31. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1964).
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ment that the agent expressly be bound to give notice of the service to
the defendants. 32 Where the requirement of notice is absent from such
a contract, the agent's acceptance of the summons and his prompt noti-
fication of the principal will validate the authorization.33 The Court
stated that even if the qualifications of an "agenf' within Rule 4(d)
(1) should be determined by applicable state law, the appointment
would still be valid- because the New York statute authorizing ap-
pointment of an agent does not mention a notice requirement.35 By
such a rationale, the Court avoided resolving the question of whether
state or federal law was determinative-a consideration the dissenting
opinions felt controlling., By way of dissent,36 Mr. Justice Black urged
that New York law was determinative because there was no federal
policy to be promoted, and also because that was the law the parties
had designated to govern the contract.37 Basing his decision on New
York law, as interpreted by Rosenthal v. United Transport Co.,38 he
felt that the agency authorization would have been invalid.39 Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan also dissented 40 but favored the formulation of a uniform
federal standard which would define "agent" within Rule 4(d) (1).
He would invalidate the appointment where the agent was not re-
quired by the contract to give prompt notice 41 and where there was a
conflict of interest.
42
In making a determination of the law applicable to a particular
issue in a diversity case, the federal courts are often confused and un-
certain. Especially is this uncertainty present when the issue involves
the Federal Rules. How can the courts promote the policy of uni-
32. Id. at 316.
33. Ibid. See also 2 WILLIsoN, CoNTRAcrs § 274 (3d ed. 1959).
34. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, supra note 31, at 316-17.
There is a conflict of opinion whether the appointment would be valid under New
York law. See infra note 39 for a discussion of this question.
35. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 220.
36. 375 U.S. at 318.
37. Id. 321-22. See also the contract clause quoted note 1 supra.
38. 196 App. Div. 540, 188 N.Y.S. 154 (1921).
39. The Rosenthal case was based on the forerunner of § 227 of the Civil Practice
Act which sets forth the procedure by which a resident of New York may appoint an
agent to receive service of process. Rosenthal held that it applied only to residents of
the state who have subsequently left the state, and then only when the designation had
been filed as required by the statute. Mr. Justice Black construed the case as holding
that a non-resident could not appoint an agent in New York to receive service of process.
See the majority's answer to Mr. Justice Black's argument at 317 n.8. See also
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Graphic Art Designers, Inc., 36 Misc. 2d 442, 234
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962), which held valid in that case the very same contract clause that
is in issue in the instant case, and Phillips v. Carramore, 36 Misc. 2d 1041, 233 N.Y.S.
2d 842 (1962), which upheld an agency authorization by a non-resident very similar to
the one in the instant case.
40. 375 U.S. at 333.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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formity sought by the Federal Rules without infringing upon the Erie-
Guaranty Trust-Byrd doctrine? The decision can no longer rest upon
the drawing of an imaginary line between those things which are "pro-
cedurar' and those which are "substantive", as Erie drew it, but must
be decided by the application of the definition of substantive law as
promulgated by Guaranty Trust43 and affirmed and qualified by
Byrd.4 The Federal Rules represent a valid federal policy and they
should be followed whenever they will not interfere with the enforce-
ment of a state-created right. Rule 4 sets out in detail the method by
which service is to be made. This function should be governed by a
federal standard so as to achieve the uniformity sought by the Federal
Rules.45 The definition of who may qualify as an appointed agent
to receive service should also be a part of this federal standard since
it bears directly on the sufficiency of the service. If the process is
served on a person not the properly appointed agent, the service is in-
complete, and the court cannot properly function to enforce the rights
of the parties. The decision in the instant case was, unquestionably,
correct; however, the Supreme Court could have removed some of the
confusion in this area by making a definite statement as to the applic-
ability of the federal standard.
Labor Law-NLRA-Union's Duty To Represent Fairly
The plaintiff's employer, Dealers Transport, absorbed the Louisville
operation of defendant's employer, E. & L. Transport. Plaintiff lost
his job when the seniority lists of the two firms were dovetailed by
a decision of the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Commit-
tee.' The collective bargaining agreement provided that the joint
Committee was the apex of the joint grievance procedure,2 and that
43. Supra note 13.
44. Supra note 17.
45. It will be noted that Rule 4(d) (7) provides for the service of process to be made
in any matter authorized by the state. When service is made under that section, it is
without question that state standards as to the sufficiency of the service should be con-
trolling.
1. The Automobile Transporters Joint Conference is composed of representatives of
the union and management. The former is represented on the Joint Committee by
the National Truckaway and Driveaway Conference and the latter by the Automobile
Transporters Labor Division.
2. The following is the collective bargaining agreement between the Automobile
Transporters Labor Division and National Truckaway and Driveaway Conference,
article 7, section 2(d), as quoted at 375 U.S. 335, 338 (1964). "It is agreed that
all matters pertaining to the interpretation of any provision of this Agreement, whether
requested by the Employer or the Union, must be submitted to the full Committee
of the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Committee, which Committee, after
listening to testimony on both sides, shall make a decision."
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its decision was final and binding.3 Plaintiff argued that Dealers
had not absorbed E. & L. within the meaning of article 4 of the
collective bargaining agreement 4 and that the Joint Committee was
delegated only the authority to determine seniority, not jobs.5 Plain-
tiff further argued that, because the settlement was beyond the Joint
Committee's power, his discharge was a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement. 6 Moreover, plaintiff alleged that the union
breached its duty of fair representation, 7 because the local union
president had deceitfully represented to plaintiff that his job was
secure but had subsequently recommended to the Joint Committee
that the seniority lists be dovetailed, thereby causing plaintiff to
lose his job. The union president had assured plaintiff that his job
was not in jeopardy but later learned that the transaction between
Dealers and E. & L. was an absorption within the collective bargain-
ing agreement, and that dovetailing seniority lists was therefore
required. Since E. & L. was an older company whose employees,
including defendant, had more seniority than those of Dealers, plain-
tiff and other employees of Dealers were laid off. Plaintiff sued,
alleging a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, in a
Kentucky state court, and was granted an injunction8 preventing the
union and the company from carrying out the decision of the Joint
Committee. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. Federal
3. An award by a grievance committee, which is final and binding under the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, will be enforced by the court. Local 89,
General Drivers v. Riss & Co., Inc., 372 U.S. 517 (1963).
4. Article 4, section 5, reads as follows: "In the event that the Employer absorbs
the business of another private, contract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger
of lines, the seniority of the employees absorbed or affected thereby shall be deter-
mined by mutual agreement between the Employer and the Unions involved. Any
controversy with respect to such matter shall be submitted to the joint grievance
procedure." As quoted at 375 U.S. 335, 338 (1964).
5. "[S]eniority rights for employees shall prevail" and "any controversy over the
employees' standing on such lists shall be submitted to the joint grievance pro-
cedure .. " Article 4, section 1. As quoted at 375 U.S. 335, 337-38 (1964).
6. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, or Taft-Hartley Act, as
it is commonly called, states: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
7. "By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the agent of all the
employees, charged with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and
impartially." Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). The Union must
make an effort to serve the interests of its membership with "complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
8. The state court was not pre-empted from enjoining the union and the employer
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law, controlling an action in state courts arising under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, gives wide discretion and
latitude to the parties when they interpret their own collective bar-
gaining agreement; plaintiff stated a cause of action under section
301 of the LMRA but failed to prove his claim that he had not been
fairly represented. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
Section 301 of the LMRA9 is the basis for concurrent federal and
state court jurisdiction' in cases of an alleged breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. A federal common law" has developed
to fulfill the congressional mandate of judicial enforcement of such
agreements. 12 An individual or a union has a cause of action under
section 301 of the LMRA even though the facts would also support
an action for unfair labor practice within the National Labor Relations
Board's primary jurisdiction. 3 A recent Supreme Court decision
clearly enunciated the background of the court's opinion in the in-
stant case.
The rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and conditions
of employment are a major focus of the negotiation and administration of
collective bargaining contracts. Individual claims lie at the heart of the
grievance and arbitration machinery, are to a large degree inevitably inter-
twined with union interests, and many times precipitate grave questions
concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining
contract on which they are based.' 4
An individual employee must be fairly represented by the
exclusive bargaining agent and must be given an opportunity
to be heard when he has a grievance. The union's duty fairly to
represent its members has been found in several different situations
under federal statutes; the instant case finding such a duty under
section 301 of the LMRA and deciding that if the obligation is not
met, then the collective bargaining agreement cannot be enforced
to curtail the individual employee's rights. The duty of fair repre-
sentation is also required under the Railway Labor Act and the
National Labor Relations Act, and it is concommitant with the
by the doctrine of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
9. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
10. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
11. "[Tihe substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). See also Mendelsohn, Enforce-
ability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE LJ. 167
(1956).
12. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See also
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a
Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
13. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). See 16 VAND. L. REv. 1252
(1963).
14. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 13, at 200.
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authority to negotiate concerning the rights of workers. Although
these statutes established administrative agencies to deal with many
labor matters, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.15 held that an individual
worker had a cause of action arising under the federal statute en-
forceable in a state or federal court, when he was discriminated
against by the bargaining representative. 16 However, a breach of the
union's duty of fair representation may be imputed to the employer
as an unfair labor practice if the breach is related to union member-
ship, loyalty, the acknowledgement of union authority or the per-
formance of union obligations, in violation of section 8 of the NLRA.
Such a violation would be an act committed by either the union or
the employer, the natural and forseeable consequence of which would
be beneficial or detrimental to the union. 7 A collective bargaining
agent has broad statutory authority, 18 and so long as he acts reasonably
and fairly there are no grounds for a charge that a union committed
an unfair labor practice coming within the initial jurisdiction of the
NLRB.' 9 In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,20 the Court set out the
bargaining agent's authority as contained in sections seven and nine
of the NLRA.2 1 The Court noted that Congress had expressed its
faith in "free collective bargaining between employers and their
employees when conducted by freely and fairly chosen representa-
tives of appropriate units of employees."
22
A bargaining representative does not have absolute authority. A
union must honestly and without hostility serve the interests of all
15. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
16. "The duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms of the Act [NLRA]
extend beyond the mere representation of the interests of its own group members.
By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the agent of all the em-
ployees, charged with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and im-
partially." Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944).
17. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Although this case was
decided under the Railway Labor Act, it is cited by the Court as an example of the
requirement for fair representation in cases under the NLRA. Therefore, the same
requirement is present in both acts. See, e.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Union, Local 23,
350 U.S. 892 (1955). See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
18. "Many provisions do little but establish the framework for further bargaining.
Others have a generality which obviously looks to joint labor-management particular-
ization." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See also Cox,
Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. BE v. 601, 606 (1955). NLRA Section
8(d): "For the purpose of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation . . . to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the nego-
tiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder . 61 Stat. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
19. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 337. See also note 18 supra.
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its members.23 An employee has a federal right to fair representation,
a right derived from the bargaining representative's duty and implied
from the statute and its underlying policy.24 The duty of fair repre-
sentation implicit in section nine is breached by a union's unfairness
to an employee acquiesced in by the employer, but this is not an
unfair labor practice under section 8, unless it tends to encourage
union membership.25 Not all personal rights may be vindicated
through a lawsuit or proceedings before the NLRB. Section 203(d)
of the LMRA states, "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settle-
ment of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpreta-
tion of an existing collective bargaining agreement . ". ..- The
individual stating a cause of action under section 301 may sue, but
when his bargaining unit has provided either for negotiations that
have finality or for conclusion by an arbitrator, the contract is specifi-
cally enforceable. The congressional policy of section 203(d) can be
carried to fruition only by allowing the parties a broad interpretation
of their agreement.27 It is inevitable that the terms of a negotiated
agreement will affect individual employees differently, but this alone
does not make an agreement invalid, since it would be unrealistic to
expect each individual represented by a bargaining agent to be
completely satisfied with each agreement. Therefore, "a wide range
of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representa-
tive in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete
good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."
8
23. Id. at 337.
24. Supra note 19. The union's broad power as exclusive bargaining agent is
equalled in scope by its responsibility and duty to represent fairly all those affected
by the collective bargaining agreement.
25. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
26. "The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to
submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator .... The courts, there-
fore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there
is ...particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim."
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); General
Drivers Union, Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963); United Steelworkers v. En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See Cox, Current Problems in the
Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocc" Mr. L. Rv. 247 (1958).
27. Both the individual worker and his employer are bound, even though they
prefer a different arrangement. Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements, 8 LAB. L.J. 850 (1957). A bargaining representative has the quasi-
legislative power to restrict the rights of those whom it represents. J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
28. NLRA section 7: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ... ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1958). NLRA section 9(a): "Representatives designated or selected
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In the instant case the Court found that plaintiff alleged a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement under section 301(a) of the
LMRA29 within the cognizance of federal and state courts. The Court
found that plaintiff failed to prove dishonesty and breach of duty
by the union that would invalidate the decision of the Joint Com-
mittee. The basis of the finding of no dishonesty was that three
shop stewards had represented the employees of Dealers before the
Joint Committee, thus protecting plaintiff's right to be heard and to
be represented fairly. The Court took the position that the collective
bargaining agreement was fixed as it was written, subject to reasona-
ble interpretation, but not modification, by the Joint Committee, even
though the parties to the agreement composed the Joint Committee.
The Court restricted the Joint Committee in the same manner as it
would have restricted the authority of an impartial third party, an
arbitrator, who was called upon to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement. The Court concluded that the Joint Committee did not
act beyond its authority because power over seniority ° gave it power
over jobs and also authority to dovetail the seniority lists on a
rational basis, such as length of service at either company. This
solution was neither unique nor arbitrary, but one familiar and fre-
quently used when an absorption or merger precipitates conflicting
interests among employees.31 Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring in
the judgment, did not agree that plaintiff stated a cause of action
arising under section 301(a) of the LMRA. He said that Moore's
claim must be treated as an individual employee's action for a union's
breach of its duty of fair representation-a duty derived from the
NLRA, not from the collective bargaining contract.32 Goldberg con-
tinued that, when an employer and a union reach a mutually ac-
ceptable grievance settlement as was done by the Joint Committee,
an individual employee may not dissent under section 301(a) "on
the ground that the parties exceeded their contractual powers in
making the settlement," because the parties may modify, amend and
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the em-
ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 61 Stat.
143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
29. Supra note 13.
30. Supra note 4.
31. Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1962). "Inte-
gration of seniority lists should ordinarily be accomplished on the basis of each
employee's length of service with his original employer .... ." Kahn, Seniority Prob-
lems in Business Mergers, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 361, 378 (1955). NLRB v.
Whelan Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959); Kent v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. 204 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1953).
32. 375 U.S. at 351 (concurring opinion).
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supplement their agreement. 33 Moreover, he said, "the grievance
procedure is ... a part of the continuous collective bargaining pro-
cess." 34 Mr. Justice Goldberg concluded that federal common law
will not reflect the realities of industrial life if the parties' power to
settle grievances is limited to the confines of the existing labor agree-
ment and the parties may not make a settlement that goes "beyond
the strict terms of the existing contract."35
A union must be able to enforce the collective bargaining agree-
ment against the employer and also have the power to bind its mem-
bers to the agreement and to subsequent adjustments of grievances
thereunder. This does not prevent an individual employee from
bringing a grievance before his employer directly or from suing for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement as an individual plain-
tiff. Individual presentation of grievances facilitates good industrial
relations, but suits by single union members should be reserved for
personal claims where there is a great danger of unfairness to the
individual.36 This follows from the union's duty and authority to
represent the individual workers in a particular industry. Only when
the union fails to discharge this duty is individual action proper. The
standard of fairness to be applied is a product of the collective bar-
gaining process. The development of the collective bargaining
agreement gradually fills gaps unforeseen at its inception in
a manner contrary to the notion that a relationship has a constant
legal meaning which may be ascertained by interpreting the already
existing collective bargaining agreement. When an agreement is
static, the validity or impropriety of a particular claim can be applied
to a fixed standard for final determination. Where a collective bar-
gaining agreement is involved, however, the major premise to which
all disputes are referred is subject to constant change, because
the parties involved may renegotiate their agreement. It is not dif-
ficult to ascertain whether a compromise was reached through a
fair bargaining procedure, but as long as there is negotiation in
which individual substantive rights are subject to the interest of
the group as a whole, the question of whether or not an individual
has been treated fairly may be difficult to determine. There is no
problem in ascertaining whether the standard of fairness was met in a
Steele37 type fact situation, but when the inevitable compromise of
grievances is made by the collective bargaining representative, in-
dividual rights are necessarily affected.
33. 375 U.S. at 352 (concurring opinion).
34. 375 U.S. at 355, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
35. 375 U.S. at 355 (concurring opinion).
36. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAzv. L. REv. 601 (1956).
37. See note 15 supra.
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The union must balance group interests against the claims of an
individual. In the instant case the claim may have been sufficiently
personal to warrant an indiiidual suit by the employee under the
NLRA as suggested in Goldberg's concurrence as well as a suit under
section 301(a) as held by the majority. The practical value of the
right to fair representation or the right to bring an action to enforce
the collective bargaining agreement under section 301 (a) is, however,
weakened by the individual's lack of financial strength. This weak-
ness directly affects his ability to obtain skilled legal services and to
sustain a successful court action. Furthermore, "the aggrieved em-
ployee's ability to proceed in court against the employer is seriously
limited by the usual arbitration provisions which only the union can
enforce... and an action by him against either the employer or the
union is likely to encounter the primary jurisdiction and 'arguably
subject' doctrines so that he must make an excursion to the Board
in any event" to exhaust his administrative remedies.38 The individual
might worsen his position, rather than advance it, even though he
has a bona fide action. Another possible side effect of individual suits
is a subsequent shirking of responsibility by union officials. They
might fail to advance worthy claims under the guise of legal remedies
readily available to the employee in lieu of the grievance procedure.
On the other hand they might fail to discountenance unworthy claims
because they lack power to effectuate their decisions.39 The ultimate
problem of establishing a well coordinated, just, and efficient means
of redressing grievances is best resolved by the full development of
the collective bargaining process. This requires that settlements
reached between an employer and a union have finality at the
earliest practical stage of the grievance procedure. It is axiomatic
that reliance on law-suit protection of employees' rights is futile
without an effective grievance procedure. If the rights of individual
employees are held to be vested after the collective bargaining con-
tract has been negotiated, and such rights may not be altered by the
employer and the bargaining representative, then the effectiveness of
the grievance procedure has been impaired.
38. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 186, n.7 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly.
J., dissenting).
39. See text preceding note 35 supra.
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Labor Law-Walsh-Healey Act-Secretary of Labor
Not Authorized To Set More Than One
Prevailing Wage
The Secretary of Labor gave notice' that a hearing was to be held
to determine the prevailing wages in the machine tools industry
under section 1(b) 2 of the Walsh-Healey Act.3 The Secretary de-
termined one prevailing wage for one occupation within the industry
and another4 for all other "covered workers."5  Plaintiffs, eleven
manufacturers of machine tools, brought an action to void this de-
termination on the grounds that the Secretary of Labor was not
authorized by section 1(b) of the Walsh-Healey Act to set different
prevailing wages on an occupational basis. On plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, held, granted. The Secretary of Labor is not
authorized under section 1(b) of the Walsh-Healey Act to set more
than one prevailing wage for covered workers in an industry con-
tracting with the United States Government. Barber-Colman Co. V.
Wirtz, 224 F. Supp. 137 (D.D.C. 1963).
After the Supreme Court invalidated the National Industrial Re-
covery Act in 1935,6 Congress immediately began the consideration
of proposals that ultimately resulted in the Walsh-Healey Act. The
same year, the Davis-Bacon Act, which regulated wages paid to
workers engaged in construction for the government, was amended
to provide for the fixing of minimum wages for the "various classes
of laborers and mechanics" which wages are "to be prevailing for
the corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on
projects of a character similar to the contract work." (Emphasis
added.) 7 Also in 1935, the Senate passed a bill8 to regulate suppliers
of goods to the government, which used language very similar to
1. 26 Fed. Reg. 7550 (1961).
2. Walsh-Healey Act § 1(b), 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §
35 (1958).
3. Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1958).
4. The Secretary determined that the prevailing wage for employees' engaged in
the occupations of blueprint machine operator and draftsman to be $1.65 an hour
and set a wage of $1.80 an hour for all other occupations. 41 C.F.R. § 50-202.28
(1963).
5. "[T]he Act covers those employees, regardless of location of factories or depart-
ments, whose tasks are a part of and normally associated with the production of the
contracted articles." Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 40 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.N.Y.
1941), reo'd on other grounds, 128 F.2d 208, (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 501
(1943). The trend has been toward broadening the scope of coverage. At first, it
was restricted to those workers engaged directly in production, but now it is being
applied to those who are connected less with actual production.
6. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
7. Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 49 Stat. 1011 (1935), 40
U.S.C. § 276(a) (1958).
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the Davis-Bacon Act. The bill would clearly have allowed the
Secretary of Labor to set multiple minimum wage rates by occupa-
tion. The House rejected this bill in committee and favorably
reported a bill9 whose wage provisions are identical with that of
the Walsh-Healey Act as finally adopted. The Act provides "that all
persons employed by the contractor . . . will be paid . . . not less
than the minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor
to be the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on
similar work or in the particular or similar industries. . ... u0 Since
the Davis-Bacon Act is generally conceded to be the precedent for
Walsh-Healey, it is significant that Congress rejected the language
of Davis-Bacon presented to it by the Senate bill. The stable con-
struction industry with its well-defined strata of employment is
much more susceptible to multiple occupational minimum wages
than are the more diversified industries engaged in supplying goods
to the government.'1
The Davis-Bacon Act has been consistently interpreted to allow
8. "All persons employed . . . in classes of employment . . . [shall be paid] not
less than such minimum rates of pay . . . as shall be designated specifically or by
reference in the invitation to bid." (Emphasis added.) S. 3055, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1 (1935).
9. H.R. REP. No. 2946, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
At the hearings, Mr. John Gall for the National Association of Manufacturers
opposed the Senate bill because of its wage provisions: "I think it clear from what
the Secretary of Labor said here that she contemplates . . . the fixing of wages
above the minimum, that is, in all classes of labor in a plant . . . I submit [that]
this bill should be confined to the prevention of sweatshop conditions by attention
only to the minimum wage for the lowest paid class of labor .. " Hearings on H.R.
11554 and S. 3055 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 456 (1936).
Congressman Healey explained on the floor that the Act would not provide for
establishing different minimum wages for different occupational classes of employees
within an industry. "This bill does not set the standard for minimum wages by
reference to the codes that obtained under N.R.A., but definitely sets it as the pre-
vailing wage for similar work or in the industries operating in the locality in which
the contract is to be performed. The bill merely provides for a proper determination
by the Secretary of Labor with respect to such prevailing wage." (Emphasis added.)
80 CoNc. REc. 10002 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Healey).
10. Walsh-Healey Act § 1(b), 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35
(1958).
11. The argument is that to allow the establishment of occupational minima in
the many industries supplying goods to the government would further complicate an
already complex field. This argument loses some of its force when one considers that
this plea for administrative simplicity is being made by the industry and not by the
administrator.
In opposing Senator Fulbright's proposed amendment to § 1(b), which would
have allowed the Secretary to establish different minima for each town or city, Senator
Lodge made a similar argument. "The proposal to fix wages on a local basis, where
the Secretary of Labor presently reaches a single minimum wage decision for an
entire industry, would require the Secretary to make literally thousands of decisions
in one industry alone. Multiply that by the number of industries covered by the
Walsh-Healey Act and the number of individual decisions required of the Secretary
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the setting of occupational minimum wages in the construction in-
dustry. However, the Secretary has, up until the instant case, con-
sistently refused to set multiple occupational wages under section
1(b) of Walsh-Healey. 12 The first case to come before the Secre-
tary of Labor after the adoption of the Act involved the problem of
setting multiple minima for different occupations. There, Secre-
tary of Labor Frances Perkins stated "that the act authorizes the
fixing of only one minimum wage in an industry and does not permit
the establishment of occupational minima." 13 However, under sec-
tion 1(b)' there have been established (1) different minima for
different products or branches of an industry; 14 and (2) different
minima for different geographical areas of an industry. 5 But this
is different from setting occupational wages. Section 6, which the
Secretary contends supports his action, provides in pertinent part
that "the Secretary of Labor may provide reasonable limitations and
may make rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations, toler-
ances, and exemptions to and from any and all provisions of . . .
[this Act] respecting minimum rates of pay. ... 16 Under this
language, tolerances in wages have been allowed for probationary
workers, 1'7 learners and beginners, 8 and auxiliary workers or helpers. 19
But these situations are quite different from setting multiple minima
by occupation for regular, experienced, covered workers.
20
The court's reasoning in the instant case is based on the legislative
of Labor would run into astronomical figures. To attempt to fix wages on a city,
town or village basis is simply an administrative absurdity." Hearings on S. 2594
and S. 2645 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2791 (1952).
12. Men's Hat and Cap Indus., 2 Fed. Reg. 1335 (1937). See also Comment, 48
YALE L.J. 610, 626 (1939).
13. Men's Hat and Cap Indus., supra Note 12.
14. Paper and Paperboard Containers and Packaging Prod. Indus., 28 Fed. Reg.
9048 (1963); Battery Indus., 28 Fed. Reg. 3071 (1963); Woolen and Worsted Indus.,
19 Fed. Reg. 1930 (1954); Chemical and Related Prod. Indus., 15 Fed. Reg. 9238
(1950), Cotton Garment and Allied Indus. to the Manufacture of Wool and Wool-
lined Jackets, 3 Fed. Reg. 896 (1938); Fireworks Indus., 3 Fed. Reg. 2370 (1938).
15. Bituminous Coal Indus., 28 Fed. Reg. 8044 (1963); Dimension Granite Indus.,
9 Fed. Reg. 6888, 6889 (1944); Evaporated Milk Indus., 6 Fed. Reg. 5074 (1941);
Luggage and Saddlery Indus., 3 Fed. Reg. 1733 (1938). That the whole nation
can be the 'locality" see, Mitchell v. Covington Mills, 229 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1002 (1956).
16. Walsh-Healey Act § 6, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 40
(1958).
17. Evaporated Milk Indus., 6 Fed. Reg. 5074 (1941).
18. Woolen and Worsted Indus., supra note 14.
19. Bituminous Coal Indus., supra note 15; Uniform and Clothing Indus., 6 Fed.
Reg. 646 (1941).
20. Obviously, learners, beginners, probationary and auxiliary workers are not
the workers on which a prevailing wage in an industry is based. Generally, this type of
worker is paid below the minimum wage, and they are considered as "sub-minimum"
or "sub-normal" workers. See note 22 infra.
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history and administrative practice concerning section 1(b) of the
Walsh-Healey Act. The court accepts plaintiffs' contention that all
previous cases in which the Secretary set multiple minima were de-
cided under section 6 which provides for tolerances and variations
from the prescribed minimum in certain unusual situations. The
court reasoned that since the action was unauthorized under section
1(b), and the notice of hearing announced that the prevailing wage
would be determined under section 1(b), the Secretary's action was
unauthorized. The opinion does not answer plaintiffs' contention
that the action could not be authorized under either section 1(b) or
section 6, or both.
Although the court decided that section 1(b), independent of
section 6, does not authorize the setting of multiple minima,21 it may
have decided that section 6 would have authorized the action taken.2
If this is the case, the Secretary had the authority to set multiple
minima, but merely went about it the wrong way. If this is the view
of the court, the only infirmity in the Secretary's action was his
failure to give proper notice under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 3 which is made applicable by section 10 of the Walsh-Healey
Act.24 The Administrative Procedure Act requires that the notice
include "reference to the authority under which the rule is proposed"
and "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a descrip-
tion of the subjects and issues involved."25 The court stated: "The
fact is that at no time did the Secretary purport to be acting under
the provisions of section 6 of the Act."s The plaintiffs claim that
their rights to notice and a hearing under section 10 of the Walsh-
Healey Act 27 were violated because the issue of occupational wages
was not described in the Secretary's notice.28 Therefore, there was
21. "[A]s a matter of law . . .the determination by the Secretary is not authorized
by Section 1(b) of the Act under which the Secretary acted." 224 F. Supp. at 142.
22. The Plaintiffs' argue that section 6 was designed for the exceptional, "sub-
normar' wage situation. The cases so far have been limited to what is considered in
industry as the "sub-minimum wage" workers such as learners and beginners and
this justifies excluding them from the workers who go together to make up the
"prevailing wage." The Secretary argues, on the other hand, that he is authorized
by the Act to make any exclusion or exemption which he sees fit. Excluding the
lower paid workers from consideration in deciding the median wage has the effect
of raising the "prevailing wage" for all the other workers.
23. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
24. 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 432 (1958).
25. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a)
(1958).
26. 224 F. Supp. at 141.
27. 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. 43a (1958).
28. The notice of hearing stated the following issues: (1) the definition of the
industry; (2) "what are the prevailing minimum wages in the industry"; (3)
whether there should be an industry-wide wage determination or separate deter-
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no opportunity to present evidence or to address argument to the
legal grounds or reasons of the Secretary's action.29  If the court
meant by its decision that the action was authorized under section 6,
it is submitted that the court was correct in holding the action invalid
for failure to give notice of consideration under section 6.30 The
question remains, however, whether the Secretary could have done
this under section 6. It is submitted that section 6 would not have
supported the action taken by the Secretary. The Secretary's power
to set occupational wages has always been used only for the ex-
ceptional situation. The court's decision may mean, as plaintiffs con-
tend, that setting separate minima for regular covered workers is
outside the scope of authority given in either section 1(b) or section
6. This argument is supported by the legislative history.31 Since the
occupational wage grouping language of Davis-Bacon 32 was express-
ly rejected by Congress and the single wage language of section
1(b) of Walsh-Healey 33 put in its place, Congress must have meant
to establish only a single minimum wage for an industry. Section 6
has been interpreted to give certain limited exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of section 1(b) for "sub-normal" workers in situations
where industry usually provides for so-called "sub-minimum wages."34
The consistent administrative practice of setting only one prevailing
wage in an industry, with only limited exceptions permitted by sec-
tion 6, has gone unchallenged by Congress even though it has con-
sidered proposals to amend the Act at virtually every session.35 The
basic purpose of the Act is "to use the leverage of the Government's
mination for separate geographic areas; (4) whether any determination should pro-
vide "for the employment of beginners or probationary workers at wages lower than
the prevailing minimum wages." 26 Fed. Reg. 7550 (1961).
29. Since the notice stated that consideration was to be under section 1(b) and
occupational wage determinations was not one of the issues, the industry was not
prepared to argue occupational wages.
30. "This is not merely a matter of form, but is one of substance. . . . Under
the notice of hearing given in this case, the industry was entitled to proceed on the
assumption that the hearing would relate to all covered workers and that the evi-
dence was to be presented on that basis." 224 F. Supp. at 142.
31. See notes 7, 8, 9, 10 supra and accompanying text.
32. Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 49 Stat. 1011 (1935),
40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1958).
33. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
34. See notes 17, 18, & 19 supra.
35. The Portal to Portal Act, 61 Stat. 84 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1959), was
enacted in 1947 to supplement the wage provisions of the Walsh-Healey Act, the
Davis-Bacon Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1958). Senator Fulbright's amendment in 1952 became section 10 of
the Walsh-Healey Act, 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43a (1958). Another
amendment proposed at the same time by Senator Fulbright would have changed
the language of section 1(b). It would have substituted for the word "locality"
parallel language from Davis-Bacon. 98 CoNc. REc. 4128 (1952).
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immense purchasing power to raise labor standards."36  Flexibility
in determining the wages to be paid could, arguably, better enable
the Secretary to fulfill the purpose of the Act by preventing "wage-
chiseling" in the higher paid brackets. On the other hand, to deal
with the many different industries ranging from manufacturers of
soap to grenades and sheep-lined jackets to bituminous coal, with
their thousands of ill-defined crafts and wage brackets, on an occu-
pational basis could become so tedious and complex as to lead to
injustice. In any case, occupational minima are unnecessary.37 If
the minimum wage is set at a certain level, all of the other wages
are rated by long settled practices of seniority and collective bar-
gaining agreements. 38 If this decision means that the action was
authorized by section 6, it will have the effect of broadening the
power of the Secretary to establish a tolerance or exception for the
lower paid, regular, experienced workers, and thus take them out
of the consideration in determining the prevailing wage. This would
result in a higher minimum being set, making it even more costly
to contract with the government. 39 If this decision means that the
action here, as plaintiffs contend, was not authorized by any part of
the Walsh-Healey Act, the effect is that the Secretary will have to
set only one minimum wage for all covered workers and section 6
will continue to be limited to the exceptional sub-minimum wage
situation.
36. Ruth Elkhorn Coals, Inc. v. Mitchell, 248 F.2d 635 (D.D.C. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 953 (1958), quoting Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S.
501, 507 (1943).
37. See note 11 supra.
38. Congressman Duffy of New York stated that it is "usually understood that the
minimum wage, like the bottom rung of a ladder, affects all of the rates above it....
Men coming into a community want to know the wage for labor, and they know from
that the upper scale." Hearings on H.R. 11554 and S. 3055 Before House Committee
on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 456 (1936).
39. "It is clear that the final determination in this case was based upon evidence
which did not include all covered workers. This failure to include ... [all] covered
workers in determining the prevailing wage was prejudicial to the industry and of




Torts-Right of Privacy-Reasonableness of
Investigation of Personal Injury Claimant
Two recent decisions concerned alleged invasions of the privacy of
personal injury claimants by investigators retained on behalf of the
defendants in the personal injury actions. In Case 1, plaintiff sought
injunctive relief and money damages for an invasion of privacy re-
sulting from defendant's surveillance of her, during which plaintiffs
activities were filmed by motion picture cameras.' The lower court
denied plaintiff's claim for recovery. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, held, affirmed. No action will lie for invasion of the
right of privacy based on a reasonable investigation made in public
areas. Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963).
Case 2 was an action for damages for an invasion of plaintiff's
privacy based on defendant's constant shadowing at all hours of the
day and night over a four-month period.2 The trial court overruled
defendant's demurrers and on appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Georgia, held, affirmed. Plaintiff has an action for invasion of privacy
where the conduct of the surveillance exceeds that which is necessary
for the purpose intended and would be offensive to a person with
normal reactions. Pinkerton National Detective Agency, Inc. v.
Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963).
The right of privacy-recognized in a majority of jurisdictions3-is
divided by Dean Prosser into four distinct wrongs.4 The two instant
cases illustrate the first of these wrongs, "the intrusion upon the
plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion." 5 This invasion or intrusion
1. The motion pictures were taken of plaintiff on four separate occasions while she
was driving on a public street. Defendant was a private detective employed by an
insurer for a party against whom plaintiff had filed a complaint for injuries suffered
in an automobile accident.
2. This shadowing included eavesdropping around plaintiff's home, cutting a hole
through her hedge and observing her through said opening, calling at her home under
the pretense of being salesmen, and following her closely in other public places. This
surveillance was a result of plaintiff's filing a personal injury action against defendant's
employer. The privacy action was also brought against the insurance company which
represented the defendant in the personal injury action, but the appeal is basically
concerned with the action against the defendant detective agency who investigated
the plaintiff's activities.
3. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 386 (1960). For other detailed accounts
of the history and development of this right, see Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347
Ill. App. 293, 108 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Gas. Co., 226
La. 644, 76 So. 2d 916 (1954); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15
VA.ND. L. REv. 1093 (1962).
4. These four wrongs are: (1) "the intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude
or seclusion," (2) "publicity which violates the ordinary decencies," (3) "putting the
plaintiff in a false but not necessarily defamatory position in the public eye," (4) "the
appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use."
P.RossER, ToRTs § 97 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Ibid.
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has taken its form primarily in several different methods of eaves-
dropping.6 Mechanical devices have often been the means used to
effect this eavesdropping. 7 Wiretapping-where the defendant taps
the telephone line of another-is one of the most often used devices
and gives rise to an action for invasion of privacy.8 However, the right
to converse privately is not absolute, for in one case the telephone
company was allowed to monitor conversations where the monitoring
was done in furtherance of a valid investigation of an obvious misuse
of the service.9 Nor will the invasion be actionable if the listener is
the subscriber to one of the "tapped" phones and he eavesdrops on
a person using that phone.10 Receiving sets and listening devices are
another source of invasion of the right of privacy. It was held to be
an actionable invasion where defendant, acting pursuant to a valid
investigation of the plaintiff's personal injury claim, eavesdropped on
her private conversations, by means of a listening device located in
plaintiff's hospital room." The court held that proof of publication
or commercialization of the conversations was unnecessary; these two
elements only serving to increase the damages by aggravating the
injury.12 There is no requirement that special damages be proved
or that the results of the investigation be made public.' 3 Movie
cameras provide another mode of invasion. The only case on this
particular point has indicated that the same tests of reasonableness
that are applied to similar mechanical devices will be followed. 14
6. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 3, at 390.
7. This problem of mechanical devices was indicated as early as 1890. "[N]umerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops."' Warren and Brandeis, The Right
of Privacy, 4 HAv. L. R-v. 193 (1890). For an excellent article on the practical uses
of such devices, see, Time, March 4, 1964, pp. 55-56.
8. "Whenever a telephone line is tapped the privacy of those talking over the line
is invaded .... " Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 229, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 (1931).
9. Schmukler v. Ohio-Bell Tel. Co., 116 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1953).
10. The person uses the phone with the "presumed understanding that his otherwise
inviolate right of privacy to that extent must be invaded." People v. Appelbaum, 277
App. Div. 43, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, (1950).
11. "[T]he individual's right to privacy is invaded and violated nevertheless in the
original act of intrusion." McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App.
92, 102, 2 S.E.2d 810, 817 (1939). (opinion was based on Georgia's "Peeping Tom"
statute, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2001 to -2004 (1953)).
12. Ibid.
13. Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 877, 105 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1958); 61 W. VA
L. REv. 230 (1959). "There has been no inclination to import into privacy the
distinction between slander per se and slander which requires proof of special damages."
Wade, supra note 3, at 112. See also, Prosser, supra note 3, at 409 where it is stated
that the action for invasion of privacy resembles libel or slander per se in that no
special damages need be proved. (Special damages are only necessary to enhance
recovery, and actual physical or mental impairment is not necessary to maintain the
action.)
14. Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
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It held that the taking of motion pictures of an employee at work
will not be actionable unless the plaintiff can show an improper or
unwarranted use'5 of the photographs. It should be noted, however,
that in this case the photographs were taken pursuant to a valid study
to increase the efficiency and safety of the manufacturing operations. 16
Close physical survellance is another technique used in eavesdrop-
ping. In Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc.,'7 an investigation
which included trespassing and window-peeping was held actionable.
Although recognizing a strong public policy in favor of such investiga-
tions to prevent the fabrication of personal injury claims, the court
found civil liability based on defendant's violation of a criminal
"Peeping Tom" statute.'8 The methods used in an allegedly valid
surveillance must bear a close relationship to the motive and purpose
of the investigation, and a surveillance for a legitimate purpose does
not justify the use of unreasonable methods.19 Although none of the
cases directly concerned with eavesdropping have specifically dis-
cussed malice,20 it has been indicated in an analogous type of in-
vasion (debt collection methods of a creditor in obtaining repayment)
that, for an action to lie, there is no requirement of malice so long as
the defendant's efforts are made with a "reckless disregard of the
plaintiffs welfare."21 The standard or test of reasonableness to be
applied "must depend largely on the facts of the particular case."
22
In Forster, the court is explicit in distinguishing between the extent
of the interest to be protected and the reasonableness of the defend-
ants conduct. It is indicated that a person who files a personal injury
claim falls within the rationale of the "public figure doctrine,"23 and
15. An improper use is indicated to be an embarrassing or libelous publication of
the photographs. Thomas v. General Elec. Co., supra note 14, at 799.
16. It should also be noted that plaintiff failed to prove any physical, or mental
impairment, nor that any embarrassment or undue criticism resulted from the taking
of the motion pictures. Id. at 799.
17. 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1956).
18. LA. REv. STAT. § 14:284 (Supp. 1952). Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, supra
note 17, at 718.
19. Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Ace. and Plant Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139
N.W. 386, 390 (1913).
20. Malice is defined by these cases as a motive to cause plaintiff mental or emotional
harm.
21. Western Guar. Loan Co. v. Dean, 309 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. App. 1958).
22. Norris v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 177, 132 So. 2d 321, 323 (1961)
(creditor's agent's three calls to other members of debtor's family alleging illicit
relationships with debtor without referring to the debt held to be an actionable
invasion).
23. This doctrine is based on the concept that entertainers, public officials, heroes
and celebrities who place themselves in the public eye have lost to a great extent their
right of privacy. Publicity concerning their private lives does not give rise to a cause
of action. For good discussions on the "public figure doctrine," see Hull v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 90, 125 A.2d 644, 650 (1956); Prosser, Pritacy,
supra note 3, at 410; Note, 28 IN. L.J. 179 (1953).
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that once the claim is filed, the plaintiff's right of privacy is circum-
scribed to the extent of a reasonable investigation of him, and he is not
entitled to the same degree of privacy in a public area as he would be
within the confines of his home. Real significance is also placed on the
social utility of such investigations in detecting fabricated personal
injury claims. The court molds a test for determining the reasonable-
ness of the methods used by comparing them to the investigatory
methods authorized by the legislature under the Private Detective
Act of 1953.24 Other factors indicating reasonableness were: no tres-
passing, or window peeping, or any intent to cause plaintiff emotional
distress;25 nor was there any evidence that the film was shown to
others. The basis for the opinion seems to be the social utility of
such investigations and the authorization of such methods by the
legislature.
In Pinkerton, the court discussed the history of the right of privacy
and demonstrated a well established recognition of that right in
Georgia. The case of Forster v. Mancheste2 6 was distinguished from
the instant case on the facts, and the court pointed out that the
methods used by the defendants here were not "reasonably unob-
strusive"2 7 but constituted "conduct beyond what would be sufficient
for the purpose intended" and would disturb an "ordinary person
without hyper-sensitive reactions." 28 The court also stated that in
the absence of willful or malicious intent, actual physical or mental
impairment is a prerequisite to a cause of action. Since electric shock
therapy was required in treating the plaintiff for emotional distress
caused by defendant's constant surveillance and "in juria in its legal
sense "2 9 was alleged, the plaintiff did not need to prove willful or
malicious intent. The holding seems to be based on the unreasonable-
ness of defendant's actions and the extent of plaintiff's actual mental
and emotional distress.
More important than the results reached in these cases (both of
which are obviously correct on their particular facts) are the stand-
ards used in determining liability. Basically, the problem must be
24. Pennsylvania Private Detective Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 12(b) (2) (1953).
The business of a private detective can include investigations of the "identity, habits,
conduct, movements, whereabouts . . . of any person," and authorizes "the securing of
evidence to be used . . . in the trial of civil . . . cases." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 12
(1953). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 26 (1953).
25. This intent to cause emotional distress is a requirement to the action based on
the theory of causing plaintiff emotional distress which is found in RESTATEAENT,
Tonis § 46, comments a, g (1939). There is a distinction between this action of
intentionally causing emotional distress and for an action for the invasion of the right
of privacy under R sTATEENTj, ToTs § 867 (1939).
26. 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963).





viewed in terms of a two-step analysis. First, to what extent is a
person's right of privacy limited when he files a personal injury claim?
This limitation is primarily centered around the public policy concept
of allowing investigations to detect and prevent the fabrication of
personal injury claims. Forster applies the rationale of the "public
figure doctrine" to personal injury claimants. This is a useful general
analogy; but without some definite qualifications on this rationale,
problem areas in the future will undoubtedly develop, for it seems
obvious that the "public figure doctrine" per se is not wholly applica-
ble to a personal injury claimant.30 The problem is one of balancing
the interests of the plaintiff and those of the public. If frivolous
and fabricated claims reach a jury without the insurance company
being allowed to investigate the extent of such alleged injuries and to
present contrary evidence, the public as a whole will suffer the cost
of increased insurance premiums. Such potential fabricated claims
are in opposition to our legal concepts of fair play and justice, and
would burden the courts with a multiplicity of suits. The second
step of the analysis concerns what the courts will consider a rea-
sonable investigation after they have concluded that the plaintiff's
right of privacy is circumscribed to a certain degree. A case by case
determination of reasonableness is not sufficiently informative for
either the courts or the public. The Forster opinion provides a more
definite standard by comparing the methods of investigation used by
the defendant to the methods authorized by the legislature in its
"Private Detective Act."3' The use of a criminal "Peeping Tom"
statute32 to find civil liability is another definite standard, and it is
quite surprising that the decision in Pinkerton was not based on
Georgia's "Peeping Tom" statute.33 It has also been held that the
Communications Act of 193434 (a criminal statute) created a co-
extensive civil action for intercepting intrastate messages if they were
sent over interstate wires.35 In the future, courts will probably rely
on such statutes, when available. Investigators and insurance com-
panies would be advised to check their state statutes on this point
30. The personal injury claimant like the public figure has lost, to some extent his
right of privacy but, it can hardly be contended that he surrenders his right of privacy
to the extent of having his image projected on newsreels, or his private life dis-
seminated to the public through books, broadcasts, articles, etc. In construing the
rights of the personal injury claimant, the court must be much more conservative
than they would be with the "public figure."
31. Pennsylvania Private Detective Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 12(b) (2) (1953).
32. GA. CODE Am. §§ 26-2001 through -2004 (1953); LA. REv. STAT. § 14,284
(Supp. 1952).
33. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2001 to -2004 (1953). For an article contending that the
court in Pinkerton did rely on this Georgia statute, see 26 GA. B.J. 326, 328 (1954).
34. Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
35. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
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and be certain that their methods neither exceed the authorization of
such acts nor fall within the reach of any criminal legislation. The fact
remains that civil liability for invasions of privacy has not received
the recognition it deserves. The limited number of cases in this
area could partly result from the lack of knowledge of the investiga-
tions or the fear of potential plaintiffs that if a suit is brought, the
action will only magnify the personal information obtained by the
illegal methods. If this right is given complete recognition by the
courts, the person under investigation will have a more effective
recourse against the investigator than merely the exclusion of the
evidence obtained by the unreasonable investigation 6 or a possible
criminal prosecution of the investigator,37 and this should provide a
very real deterrent against unreasonable investigations.
Unemployment Compensation-Interstate Agreements
Permitting Legislative Bodies of Other States To
Determine Qualifying Procedures
A Kentucky enabling act' authorized the Commissioner of Eco-
nomic Security to enter into reciprocal agreements with other states
or with the Federal Government for combining wages to determine
unemployment benefit rights. In an agreed test case,2 the act was
challenged as being unconstitutional. 3 The plan 4 to be adopted by
36. For excellent articles on the admissibility of wiretapping and other illegally
obtained evidence see, Symposium, The Wiretapping- Eavesdropping Problem: Reflec-
tions on the Eavesdroppers, 44 MiN. L. REv. 813 (1960); Brown & Pier, The Wire-
tapping Entanglement: How to Strengthen Law Enforcement and Preserve Privacy, 44
CoaNELr L.Q. 175 (1959).
37. See New York's Anti-Wiretapping Statute, N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1"423.
1. "(3) (a) Any provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Commissioner is hereby authorized to enter into reciprocal arrangements with duly
authorized agencies of other states or of the Federal Government, or both, whereby
workers with potential rights to benefits in this and another state or other states or
the Federal Government may have such rights determined upon the basis of his
combined potential rights in such jurisdictions....." Ky. REV. STAT. § 341.145
(3) (a) (1963).
2. Jurisdiction is based upon the fact that the question involved might become
the subject of a civil action by way of injunction against the commissioner. Ky. REv.
STAT. § 418.020 (1963).
3. Ky. CONST. § 29: "The legislative power shall be vested in a house of repre-
sentatives and a senate, which, together, shall be styled the 'General Assembly of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky."' A secondary issue of whether the taxes collected
to pay unemployment benefits would be unconstitutionally diverted from their
original purpose by this plan was briefly resolved in favor of constitutionality.
4. There are two possible plans, one of whichis simply an expansion of the cover-
age of the other:, the Basic Interstate Agreement for Combining Wages and the
Extended Plan for Combining Wages, detailed officially in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
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the commissioner would allow a worker to collect unemployment
insurance payments based on the wages received and time worked
in every participating state in which he was employed, such pay-
ments to be made under the provisions of the law of the state in
which the claim was made;5 the other states in which the worker
had been employed would be required to reimburse the paying
state for their proportion of the liability. This was alleged to be a
delegation of legislative power to legislatures of other states and
the Federal Government, and therefore, violative of the Kentucky
Constitution. The trial court held the act unconstitutional. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, held, reversed. The legislature
may authorize interstate agreements allowing the legislative bodies
of other states to determine qualifying procedures for unemploy-
ment compensation to which Kentucky must ultimately contribute.
Commonwealth ex rel. Powell v. Associated Industries of Kentucky,
370 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1963).
The doctrine that legislative power cannot be delegated had its
origin in the theories of separation of powers and, more specifically,
in the vesting of legislative powers in a single representative body.0
The decentralizing of modem government, however, often requires
that adequate lawmaking include statutory interpretation, rule-mak-
ing and, in fact, bald legislation by executive agencies, even at lower
levels in the federal system. Basically, where the legislature has
set up adequate standards to be followed and lacks the time or
expertise to detail the law, delegation to non-legislative bodies will
be upheldZ There is, however, another area in which the doctrine of
non-delegability has been applied. This area does not involve the
separation of powers theory and the conventional problem of dele-
INTERSTATE UNEMPLOYNIENT INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS §§ 2.0, 2.1, 2.11 (1955),
and unofficially in Conner & Cosner, Interstate Aspects of Unemployment Insitrance,
8 VA". L. REv. 478, 486-88 (1955). The Basic Interstate Agreement allovs a
claimant to combine his wage credits only from those states in which he is unable
to qualify for compensation. The Extended Plan allows a worker to add credits
sufficient to qualify in one state, but for less than maximum benefits, with wage
credits insufficient to qualify in other states. On October 15, 1963, four days after
the final ruling in the instant case, Kentucky adopted both of these plans.
5. The claimant's benefit year, base period, qualifying wages, benefit amount and
duration are determined according to the laws of the paying state. Conner & Cosner,
supra note 4, at 487.
6. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 224 (8th ed.
Carrington 1927). See generally Duff & Whiteside, Delegata Protestas Non Potest
Delegari, 14 CoanN.L L.Q. 168 (1928), for history and development of the non-
delegability doctrine; Loc=E, CrviL GolrnNmw.Nr § 142 (1690).
7. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Young




gation to an administrative agent: the problem of whether legis-
latures can delegate power to other legislatures outside of their
jurisdictions. It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that when
a legislature adopts by specific reference the statute of another state,
it adopts it only as it then exists, and a repeal of the adopted act,
or any future change of the act, does not affect the adopting act.8
However, if there is a general reference to a system or body of
laws covering the subject at hand, the adopting statute takes laws
as they shall be changed, and any repeal of the adopted act would
repeal the adopting act.9 Thus, for example, a state that, prior to
1933, pronounced that its laws defining and controlling the sale of
intoxicating liquors would be the same as those of the Federal Gov-
ernment found its laws of no effect when the Eighteenth Amend-
ment was repealed. No problem exists when the legislature at-
tempts to adopt laws of other legislatures specifically as they stand
at the time of adoption. 10 But to allow a domestic act to become
subject to the future whims and alterations of a foreign jurisdic-
tion's legislature, say a majority of courts, offends the traditional
doctrine that legislative power cannot be delegated." The trend
among academicians 12 is to make the rule the exception. 3  As in
the case of delegation to administrative agencies, so long as adequate
standards are set up, a legislature should be able to enact by
reference both the existing text of the adopted act and any future
8. Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948); Kloss v.
Suburban Cook County Tuberculosis Sanitarium Dist., 404 Ill. 87, 88 N.E.2d 89 (1949);
2 SurHmuaaas, STATUTOSR CONSTRUCTION § 5208 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
9. ibid.
10. Dawson v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958); Santee Mills v. Query, 122
S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922).
11. Wylie v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 42 Ariz. 133, 22 P.2d 845 (1933); Florida Indus.
Comm'n v. State ex. rel. Orange State Oil Co., 155 Fla. 772, 21 So. 2d 599 (1945);
State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 121 Me. 438, 117 Ad. 588 (1922); In re Opinion of
Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453 (1921); Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb.
651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935); Seale v. McKennon, 215 Ore. 562, 336 P.2d 340 (1959);
Holgate Bros. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 At. 672 (1938); State ex rel. Kirschner
v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d (1957).
12. 1 SuranE -rn, op. cit. supra note 8, § 310; Edelman, Interstate Arrangement
for the Determination and Payment of Interstate Claims-An Experiment in Inter-
state Cooperation, 10 Omo ST. L.J. 127, 135-40 (1949); Mermin, "Cooperative
Federalism" Again: State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing
and Future Federal Requirements: I, 57 YALE L.J. 1 (1947).
13. A few state courts have, like the case now under consideration, allowed
statutes contemplating future legislation in other states or the Federal Government:
Head v. McKenney, 61 Ga. App. 552, 6 S.E.2d 405 (1939) (no mention of future
changes); People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle, 242 N.Y. 277, 151 N.E. 452 (1926) (no
foreseeable injustice to those affected by the act); Commonwealth v. Warner Bros.
Theatres, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942).
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amendments.14 It has been argued in support of this point of view
that prospective laws in the other jurisdiction, if they are the objec-
tives of reciprocal agreements, are mere contingencies, or more prop-
erly, conditions, the existence or non-existence of which determines
circumstances in which the adopting act will apply. Thus, the
adopting act is not subject to "change" by the will of a "foreign"
legislature.15 The advantage gained by uniformity of law among the
states 6 has been cited as another argument against the extension of the
non-delegability doctrine. Also where a state statute attempts to
adopt federal laws in an area in which the state and Federal Gov-
ernments exercise concurrent authority, even if the adoption is so
general as to be an approval of any future change, there is essen-
tially no delegation, as federal legislation is controlling under the
supremacy clause.'7  Finally, a violation of the state constitution
cannot be asserted when the delegation culminates in the execution
of an interstate agreement.18 An interstate compact has constitu-
tional preference over any state law forbidding the compact or any
state action that seeks to nullify the agreement.19
The court here questions whether the doctrine of non-delegability
has any worthwhile use.20 There is no provision in the Constitution
of Kentucky, or in that of the United States, saying that legislative
power may not be delegated. The court reasons that the legislative
power is merely stated to be "vested" in a legislative body, and
the word "vested" certainly does not mean absolutely inalienable,
since other provisions in the Kentucky Constitution allow delega-
tion of power to such bodies as municipalities.2' Since legislative
14. This argument would appear to be pertinent only on the general fact situation
of the instant case, where an administrative agent in the adopting state is allowed
to use his discretion in making agreements with officials in other states, but con-
fined to the use of the other state's procedures. The administrative agent must follow
the standards in his discretionary dealings with out-of-state officials. Brock v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 71 P.2d 209 (1937); Mermin, supra note 12, at 7.
15. Nilva v. United States, 212 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1954); Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert,
104 Il. 653 (1882). For instance, a federal law prohibiting the transportation of
gambling devices in interstate commerce may depend for its existence and enforce-
ment in one state on the contingency that that state has not passed a law exempting
itself from the act. Or the tax liability of an out-of-state corporation which does
business in the taxing state may depend on what rate that corporation's home state
charges against the taxing state's corporations.
16. 1 Su='rLanmr, op. cit. supra note 8, § 310.
17. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945).
18. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
19. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930).
20. Commonwealth ex rel. Powell v. Associated Indus., 370 S.W.2d 584, 586
(Ky. 1963). In Dawson v. Hamilton, supra note 10, the court reached a contrary
decision on the same problem, but the court here makes no effort to distinguish
the two cases.
21. 370 S.W.2d at 587.
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power is being delegated more and more according to the exigencies
of modem government, there is no reason to say that it is exclusively
the province of the legislature. The court assumes that were John
Locke living today he would certainly have agreed that the doctrine
must be abandoned.22 The question of future changes in the un-
employment compensation laws of other states which are parties to
the agreement is not regarded as determining the constitutionality
of the Kentucky act in question. The court assumes that the Com-
missioner of Economic Security will have such discretion as is neces-
sary to deal with these future changes,2 but it does not discuss what
standards he must follow in exercising his discretion. Though this
is not the customary problem of delegation to an administrative
agency,24 the court in the instant case substantially relies on the
fact that the Commissioner of Economic Security is to administer the
reciprocal agreements. But rather than the Commissioner's safe-
guarding rights of Kentucky citizens against changes in the laws of
other states, the other states' laws are assumed to safeguard Ken-
tuckians against the acts of their own administrative agent.2 5
The court in the instant case could conceivably have considered
four questions basic to the constitutionality of an act enabling inter-
state unemployment claims agreements, though perhaps these ques-
tions were not so obvious owing to the dearth of authority on the
question.26 The first question to be asked, if the sole issue concerned
delegation of legislative authority to an administrative officer's dis-
cretion, is whether the legislature set up adequate standards in
the enabling act, by which standards the commissioner must test
every adopted present and future procedure in the other jurisdiction.
The Commissioner's discretion, when used to administer interstate
arrangements involving the laws of other states, may still require
consideration of the rules of statutory construction concerning legis-
lation by reference.27 If the sole issue, on the other hand, concerned
22. Id. at 588. The court reasons that even Locke, who originated the idea that
legislative power is non-delegable, would, in light of the experience of the last
several centuries, have abandoned his idea.
23. Id. at 589.
24. "We considered this problem (which is not the customary one of delegation of
powers to administrative agencies) in Dawson v. Hamilton .. " Id. at 586.
25. "We find the acceptance of the laws of other states or of the federal govern-
ment to be a sufficient and effective safeguard to the exercise of power by the com-
missioner-so much more than if the commissioner were handed the power without
limitation." Id. at 589.
26. No background decisions on this problem, such as would help the court in
defining the issues, have been forthcoming from those states which have approved
plans for interstate unemployment claims. As of December 1, 1961, only Alaska and
Mississippi had incorporated neither the Basic Agreement for Combining Wages nor
the Extended Plan; Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia use the
former but not the latter.
27. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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a simple delegation of power to another jurisdiction, the court
should have asked a second question: what effect would future
changes in the laws of the other jurisdiction have on the law of the
adopting state? Moreover, if this question is to be considered, the
reasoning of the court should not have been aimed at disparaging a
non-delegability theory based on separation of powers. Any attempt
to abrogate an established principle such as the doctrine against
non-delegability of legislative power from one jurisdiction to another,
though perhaps the constitutional test is misplaced, requires thorough
consideration of existing case law28 and adequate, unambiguous
explanation.
A third question which the court failed to consider would have
prompted a stronger argument against the constitutionality of inter-
state delegation of legislative authority. That question is whether
the Kentucky legislature violated fourteenth amendment due process
by giving up its sovereignty to another state. In essence, the argu-
ment is that Kentucky unemployment taxpayers will have been de-
prived of the right to have their own state decide how these tax
funds will be expended; this right will be left to legislators whom
they have no voice in electing. The due process contention may,
however, be effective only against delegation to another state; if
there were delegation to the Federal Government, the "supreme
law of the land" argument would obviate loss of due process.29
Nevertheless, as between states, the due process argument is valid
and may acquire even more force when, as in the instant case, an
administrative official is given the power to delegate the power of
the legislature to the legislature of another state, especially if the
result is an irrevocable interstate compact which is more forceful
law than that of a state constitution.30 This consideration should
bring the court to a fourth, and perhaps the most important, ques-
tion of whether a legislature can allow its hands to be inescapably
tied by the execution of an interstate agreement. Should the
"adopted" laws of the other state be changed to the disfavor of
Kentucky, it could not repudiate the change without breaching the
interstate compact.3'
28. Dawson v. Hamilton, supra note 10; see also note 11 supra.
29. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. But see City of Cleveland v.
Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945).
30. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, supra note 18, noting the favored treat-
ment to be given interstate compacts, held that no state could unilaterally nullify
the compact even though it involved a delegation of the state's legislative power.
31. There is some authority for drawing a distinction between an "agreement" and
a "compact." The distinction basically is that (1) a compact, unlike an agreement,
is formally ratified by the respective parties and becomes embodied thereby in the
state statutes; and (2) a compact usually receives the express consent of Congress,
whereas an agreement is usually never submitted for congressional ratification or
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The result in the instant case may be supported, however, by its
practical effect on the efficiency of handling the rising unemploy-
ment claims of those workers who are forced to move interstate
in search of jobs. Should the arrangements between the Commis-
sioner of Economic Security and similar officials in other states
stipulate requirements for renegotiation if the law in the other states
changes, the constitutional barrier of due process may be avoided.
Also renegotiation stipulations in the terms of the interstate agree-
ment, or at least a provision for mutual rescission of the agreement
should the laws of either state change, would lessen the danger of
breach by a dissatisfied state. If it had inquired into and found the
existence of such arrangements, then the court's decision would have
become stronger precedent for upholding interstate operations for
unemployment compensation.
rejection. Zi immAN & WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COmPACT SINCE, 1925 30-42
(1951). Practically, the distinction may result in the enforceability of the compact
only. However, the authors do submit that in the case of administrative agreements
"pursuant to specific authority conferred upon [the administrative agent] by statute,
the state is probably bound." Id. at 44. But in reference to statutes of the ordinary
kind which authorize reciprocal agreements for interstate unemployment claims, the
authors note that the legislative direction has not been detailed enough to make this
interstate agreement a compact. Whether the agreement would be enforceable
nevertheless is left unanswered. But see Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520
(1893): "Compacts or agreements-and we do not perceive any difference in the
meaning, except that the word compact is generally used with reference to more formal
and serious engagements than is usually implied in the term 'agreement' .... .. "
Even if not enforceable under the "compact clause" of the Constitution, there is still
the risk of having the agreement enforced otherwise under the Supreme Court's
general power to settle disputes between states. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,
supra note 18, at 28 (dictum).
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